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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 
 After Hudson City Bancorp (“Hudson”) merged with 
M&T Bank Corporation (“M&T”), former Hudson 
shareholders sued, alleging that the consumer banks had 
violated securities laws by omitting from their joint proxy 
materials several facts concerning M&T’s purported 
compliance with pertinent regulatory requirements.  The 
allegations presented two distinct theories of liability.  First, 
because the proxy materials did not discuss M&T’s non-
compliant practices, M&T failed to disclose significant risk 
factors facing the merger as required by Item 503(c) of 
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R § 229.503.  Second, M&T’s failure 
to discuss the allegedly non-compliant practices in the proxy 
materials rendered M&T’s opinion statements regarding its 
adherence to regulatory requirements and the prospects of 
prompt approval of the merger misleading under Omnicare, 
Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry 
Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).  The District Court 
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dismissed the suit on the ground that the allegations failed to 
plead an actionable omission under either theory.  
 
We disagree in part.  We conclude that the shareholders 
pleaded actionable omissions under Item 503(c) but failed to 
do so under Omnicare.  Additionally, we conclude that the 
shareholders plausibly alleged loss causation and thus reject 
M&T’s alternative ground for affirmance.  Accordingly, we 
will vacate dismissal of the claims concerning mandatory 
disclosure under Item 503(c) and will affirm dismissal of the 
claims concerning misleading opinions.  
I. BACKGROUND1 
This case arises out of the 2015 merger of consumer 
banks Hudson and M&T.  According to former Hudson 
shareholders, the banks violated § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), and Rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, by omitting 
several facts concerning M&T’s regulatory compliance from 
their joint proxy materials.  The alleged omissions concerned 
two non-compliant practices: (1) M&T’s having advertised no-
fee checking accounts but later switching those accounts to fee-
based accounts (the “consumer violations”); and (2) 
deficiencies in M&T’s Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money 
laundering compliance program, particularly its “Know Your 
                                              
1 These facts are taken mainly from the second amended 
complaint.  (App. A0917–72.)  Excerpts from filings are taken 
from the documents themselves.  See In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a court may consider a “document integral to or 
explicitly relied upon in the complaint” when deciding a 
motion to dismiss).  
6 
 
Customer” program (the “BSA/AML deficiencies”).  Beyond 
these general descriptions, the parties do not provide any more 
detail about M&T’s allegedly non-compliant practices.    
A. The Merger and Accompanying Disclosures 
Hudson announced its proposed merger with M&T on 
August 27, 2012.   According to the merger agreement, Hudson 
shareholders would receive a combination of M&T stock and 
cash upon the merger’s close.  The shareholder vote on the 
proposed merger was scheduled for April 18, 2013.  
 
Prior to the shareholder vote, Hudson and M&T issued 
a joint Proxy Prospectus (the “Joint Proxy”).    The Joint Proxy 
was filed with the SEC on February 22, 2013 and was mailed 
to shareholders on or around February 27, 2013.  The Joint 
Proxy contained several references to regulatory compliance.  
For instance, the Joint Proxy contained a section titled 
“Regulatory Approvals Required for the Merger.”  This section 
provided, in pertinent part: 
 
Completion of the merger and the 
bank merger are subject to the 
receipt of all approvals required to 
complete the transactions 
contemplated by the merger 
agreement [including] from the 
Federal Reserve Board . . . . 
 
Although we currently believe we 
should be able to obtain all 
required regulatory approvals in a 
timely manner, we cannot be 
certain when or if we will obtain 
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them or, if obtained, whether they 
will contain terms, conditions or 
restrictions not currently 
contemplated that will be 
detrimental to M&T after the 
completion of the merger or will 
contain a burdensome condition.  
 
Federal Reserve Board. 
Completion of the merger is 
subject, among other things, to 
approval by the Federal Reserve 
Board . . . . As part of its evaluation 
. . . , the Federal Reserve Board 
reviews: . . . the effectiveness of 
the companies in combatting 
money laundering. 
 
(App. A0304–05) (emphasis in original).  The “Risk Factors” 
section of the Joint Proxy addressed the recent increase in 
banking regulations: 
 
M&T is subject to extensive 
government regulation and 
supervision and this regulatory 
environment is being significantly 
impacted by the financial 
regulatory reform initiatives in the 
United States, including the Dodd-
Frank Act and related regulations.  
. . . 
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The United States government and 
others have recently undertaken 
major reforms of the regulatory 
oversight structure of the financial 
services industry. M&T expects to 
face increased regulation of its 
industry as a result of current and 
possible future initiatives. M&T 
also expects more intense scrutiny 
in the examination process and 
more aggressive enforcement of 
regulations on both the federal and 
state levels.  Compliance with 
these new regulations and 
supervisory initiatives will likely 
increase M&T’s costs, reduce its 
revenue and may limit its ability to 
pursue certain desirable business 
opportunities. 
. . . 
 
Reforms, both under the Dodd-
Frank Act and otherwise, will have 
a significant effect on the entire 
financial industry.  Although it is 
difficult to predict the magnitude 
and extent of these effects, M&T 
believes compliance with the 
Dodd-Frank Act and its 
implementing regulations and 
other initiatives will likely 
negatively impact revenue and 
increase the cost of doing business, 
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both in terms of transition 
expenses and on an ongoing basis, 
and may also limit M&T’s ability 
to pursue certain desirable 
business opportunities. Any new 
regulatory requirements or 
changes to existing requirements 
could require changes to M&T’s 
businesses, result in increased 
compliance costs and affect the 
profitability of such businesses. 
Additionally, reform could affect 
the behaviors of third parties that 
M&T deals with in the course of its 
business, such as rating agencies, 
insurance companies and 
investors. Heightened regulatory 
practices, requirements or 
expectations resulting from the 
Dodd-Frank Act and the rules 
promulgated thereunder could 
affect M&T in substantial and 
unpredictable ways, and, in turn, 
could have a material adverse 
effect on M&T’s business, 
financial condition and results of 
operations. 
 
(Id. at A0239–41) (emphasis in original).   
 
Additionally, M&T’s annual report on Form 10-K for 
the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, was incorporated 
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into the Joint Proxy.  The Annual Report discussed M&T’s 
current state of compliance, explaining in part: 
 
[The USA Patriot Act] imposes 
obligations on U.S. financial 
institutions, including banks and 
broker dealer subsidiaries, to 
implement and maintain 
appropriate policies, procedures 
and controls which are reasonably 
designed to prevent, detect and 
report instances of money 
laundering . . . . The Registrant and 
its impacted subsidiaries have 
approved policies and procedures 
that are believed to be compliant 
with the USA Patriot Act. 
 
(Id. at A1028.)  Although the Joint Proxy discussed the 
regulatory framework facing consumer banks, it did not 
mention M&T’s allegedly non-compliant practices. 
 
On April 12, 2013, six days before the scheduled 
shareholder vote, Hudson and M&T filed a proxy supplement, 
announcing that one of their regulators, the Federal Reserve 
Board, had identified “certain regulatory concerns with M&T’s 
[BSA/AML] procedures.”  (Id. at A1041.)  The banks 
explained that they “expect[ed] additional time [would] be 
required to obtain a regulatory determination on the application 
necessary to complete their proposed merger.”  (Id.)   
 
Three days later, on April 15, 2013, M&T’s CFO, René 
F. Jones, provided an update to investors on the expected delay.   
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Jones explained that M&T “recently [was] made aware” of the 
fact that the Federal Reserve Board had identified “certain 
deficiencies in [its] BSA/AML compliance program,” which 
“would impact [M&T’s] ability to close the merger . . . in the 
near term.”  (Id. at A0470.)  He also stated that M&T “ha[d] 
no reason to believe that the issues involve[d] any wrongdoing 
or illegal conduct by anyone in M&T or any identifiable 
instances of actual money laundering activity using [M&T],” 
but that M&T would need to “implement [a] plan [to] 
improve[]” its compliance programs before approval could be 
secured and, therefore, it did not “take regulatory approval for 
granted.”  (Id.)  None of the supplemental disclosures 
mentioned the consumer violations. 
 
Despite the projected regulatory delay, Hudson and 
M&T decided not to postpone the shareholder vote.  On April 
18, 2013, Hudson shareholders voted to approve the merger.  
Regulators eventually approved the merger more than two 
years later, and the merger closed on November 1, 2015. 
B. Procedural History 
In October 2015, David Jaroslawicz, a former Hudson 
shareholder, filed a putative class action on behalf of Hudson 
shareholders, claiming, inter alia, that the joint proxy materials 
violated the Exchange Act’s prohibition against misleading 
omissions, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a).  
The original complaint named M&T, Hudson, and their 
directors and officers as defendants.2  In January 2016, the 
                                              
2 Since the filing of this lawsuit, Hudson was merged 
into non-party Wilmington Trust Corp., a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of M&T.  Accordingly, Hudson no longer exists. 
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District Court appointed the Belina Family, former Hudson 
shareholders, to serve as lead plaintiffs.  One month later, the 
Belina Family and plaintiff Jeff Krublit, another former 
shareholder, filed an amended complaint.3   
 
M&T moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, 
which the District Court granted.  See Jaroslawicz v. M&T 
Bank Corp., No. 15-897-RGA, 2017 WL 1197716 (D. Del. 
Mar. 30, 2017).  The District Court reasoned that the first 
amended complaint failed to plausibly allege an actionable 
omission.  However, in light of allegations made for the first 
time during oral argument, the District Court granted leave to 
amend so that the shareholders could assert allegations the 
Court believed constituted misleading omissions.  
Additionally, the District Court observed, in a conclusory 
fashion, that the shareholders had plausibly alleged loss 
causation and negligence.   
 
The shareholders then filed their second amended 
complaint, adding the allegations which the District Court had 
identified as potentially relevant.  M&T moved to dismiss the 
second amended complaint.  The shareholders objected to the 
motion as duplicative of the earlier motion to dismiss and, 
alternatively, argued that the complaint was sufficiently pled.  
Before resolving the motion, the District Court requested 
additional briefing on the applicability of Item 503(c) to the 
Joint Proxy.  The parties filed a joint response, stating that 
                                              
3 For ease of reference, we will refer to Plaintiff 
Jaroslawicz and Plaintiffs–Appellants, the Belina Family and 
Krublit, as “the shareholders.”  We will refer to Defendants–
Appellees M&T, Hudson, and their directors and officers as 
“M&T,” the “bank,” or the “banks.”   
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Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–101, incorporated Item 
503(c) and that, therefore, M&T had been required to comply 
with Item 503(c).   
 
The District Court then granted M&T’s second motion 
to dismiss.  Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 296 F. Supp. 3d 
670 (D. Del. 2017).  After rejecting the shareholders’ 
procedural arguments, the District Court concluded that the 
second amended complaint failed to plead an actionable 
omission under either a mandatory disclosure or misleading 
opinion theory.  In particular, the District Court concluded that 
the complaint failed to plausibly allege that, at the time the 
proxy materials issued, the consumer violations posed a risk to 
regulatory approval of the merger.  Additionally, the District 
Court concluded that, as a matter of law, M&T had adequately 
disclosed in the Joint Proxy the risk that the BSA/AML 
deficiencies posed to the merger.  The District Court was silent 
with regard to loss causation and negligence.  Once again, the 
District Court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, 
giving the shareholders another opportunity to amend their 
pleadings. 
 
The shareholders elected to stand on their second 
amended complaint.  Shortly thereafter, the District Court 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  The shareholders 
timely filed their Notice of Appeal.   
 
We invited the SEC to participate in the appeal as 
amicus.  On July 13, 2018, we received a letter from David R. 
Fredrickson, Chief Counsel of the SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance, declining to participate as amicus but 
providing background information on the legal obligations 
imposed by the federal securities laws at issue in this case. 
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78aa and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
decision to grant a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to 
state a claim.  In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 
1322–23 (3d Cir. 2002).  We accept as true all factual 
allegations contained in the complaint and construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  Jones v. 
ABN Amro Mortg. Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A claim 
is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. 
 
The District Court reviewed the allegations in the 
second amended complaint under the general pleading 
standard set out in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The shareholders contend that this was proper 
because their claims sounded in negligence.  M&T argues that 
all § 14(a) claims, even those that sound in negligence, are 
subject to the heightened pleading requirements of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(1).  Ultimately, however, we need not resolve this issue.  
Neither party has convinced us that the pleading standard is 
determinative here.  This is because the parties do not dispute 
which statements are alleged to have been misleading; nor do 
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they dispute the specificity of those allegations.  Accordingly, 
our analysis applies with equal force under either standard.  
III. DISCUSSION 
The shareholders allege that M&T violated § 14(a) of 
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule § 14a-9.  Section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe . . . to solicit or to permit the use of his name to 
solicit any proxy . . . in respect of any security.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(a)(1).  SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits any solicitation via 
proxy that “contain[s] any statement which . . . is false or 
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to 
state any material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements therein not false or misleading . . . .”  17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a–9(a).  “To prevail on a § 14(a) claim, a plaintiff must 
show that (1) a proxy statement contained a material 
misrepresentation or omission which (2) caused the plaintiff 
injury and (3) that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the 
particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential 
link in the accomplishment of the transaction.”  Tracinda Corp. 
v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The parties dispute 
whether the second amended complaint plausibly alleged the 
first and second elements: a material omission and loss 
causation.4 
                                              
4 The shareholders assert procedural challenges to the 
propriety of the second motion to dismiss, contending that: (1) 
the motion was actually a time-barred motion for 
reconsideration; and (2) the motion was subject to the bar on 
successive motions to dismiss under Rule 12(g)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Both arguments lack merit.  
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First, the second motion to dismiss was not a motion for 
reconsideration because the District Court had previously ruled 
in M&T’s favor when it dismissed the first amended complaint 
without prejudice.  In any event, the District Court had the 
power to reconsider its own interlocutory order.  See United 
States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 493 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (“Interlocutory orders remain open to trial court 
reconsideration, and do not constitute law of the case. And the 
grant of a leave to amend is an interlocutory order.”) (citation 
and alterations omitted).  Second, Rule 12(g)(2) prohibits a 
party from making a successive motion to dismiss if that 
motion “rais[es] a defense or objection that was available to the 
party but omitted from its earlier motion.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(g)(2).  In its second motion to dismiss, M&T either raised 
new arguments opposing new allegations made in the second 
amended complaint or renewed arguments from its previous 
motion seeking to dismiss the first amended complaint.  Thus, 
the arguments raised by M&T in its second motion were either 
not previously available or not previously omitted.  
Additionally, it is well-established that if, as here, an amended 
complaint “contain[s] new information or different allegations 
making it subject to a defense or objection that was not 
previously apparent . . . a party may move to dismiss on the 
basis of the newly discovered ground even if she has filed a 
Rule 12 motion previously.”  5C Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1388 (3d 
ed. 2018).  Because it was procedurally proper to consider the 
second motion to dismiss, the District Court did not err in doing 
so. 
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We first address whether the second amended complaint 
plausibly alleged an actionable omission and then consider 
whether it plausibly alleged loss causation.5 
                                              
5 Additionally, in their briefs and at oral argument, the 
shareholders repeatedly argued that the District Court erred 
because it held that securities fraud defendants had no duty to 
perform due diligence under the federal proxy laws.  This 
argument is unavailing.  First, the District Court and the parties 
agreed that the second amended complaint sounded in 
negligence.  In the context of a § 14(a) claim, we have treated 
the negligence standard and the duty to conduct due diligence 
as interchangeable.  Gould v. American–Hawaiian S.S. Co., 
535 F.2d 761, 777–78 (3d Cir. 1976) (alternatively referring to 
the standard as a “negligence” standard and a “standard of due 
diligence”).  Second, the shareholders’ argument appears to be 
directed at the District Court’s fourth footnote, which states 
that “[t]he availability of an affirmative defense of due 
diligence does not create an affirmative duty to perform due 
diligence.”  (App. 0019.)  The shareholders contend that this 
statement conflicts with Gould’s treatment of the negligence 
standard as co-extensive with a due diligence standard. In 
context, however, the District Court was distinguishing another 
district court case, In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 628, 691–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rather than 
commenting on the mens rea requirement applicable to § 14(a) 
claims generally.  In re WorldCom was a Securities Act case 
brought pursuant to § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k, and addressed 
the specific affirmative defense of due diligence, which is 
unique to that provision and which M&T did not raise here.  
345 F. Supp. 2d at 636–67, 659, 662–64. 
18 
 
A. Whether the Second Amended Complaint 
Plausibly Alleged an Actionable Omission 
“The omission of information from a proxy statement 
will violate [§ 14(a)] if either the SEC regulations specifically 
require disclosure of the omitted information in a proxy 
statement, or the omission makes other statements in the proxy 
statement false or misleading.”  Seinfeld v. Becherer, 461 F.3d 
365, 369 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The shareholders proceeded on both theories.  First, they 
argued that the non-compliant practices posed significant risks 
to regulatory approval of the merger and therefore that 
disclosure of those risks was mandated by Item 503(c).  
Second, they contended that omitted facts related to the non-
compliant practices made two statements of opinion contained 
in the Joint Proxy misleading.    
1. Theory One: Mandatory Disclosure under Item 503(c) 
The parties agree that the Joint Proxy had to comply 
with Item 503(c). That provision requires issuers to “provide 
under the caption ‘Risk Factors’ a discussion of the most 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky.”  
17 C.F.R. 229.503. 
 
 Before the District Court, the shareholders argued that, 
while a reasonable investor might be willing to take some 
chances with regard to regulatory approval of a merger, she 
might be less willing to vote for a merger with a company that 
had committed thousands of consumer violations and 
maintained a deficient BSA/AML compliance program 
because of the heightened risk those issues pose to regulatory 
approval.  According to the shareholders, the proxy materials 
failed to disclose these non-compliant practices.  Thus, they 
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argue, the second amended complaint plausibly alleged that 
M&T violated Item 503(c). 
 
 First, we address whether the allegations in the second 
amended complaint plausibly alleged that the consumer 
violations presented a significant risk to the merger at the time 
the proxy materials issued.  Second, we explore the scope of 
adequate disclosure under Item 503(c).  Third, we decide 
whether the proxy materials sufficiently disclosed the alleged 
risk factors as a matter of law.   
a. The Second Amended Complaint Plausibly Alleged the 
Consumer Violations Presented a Significant Risk to the 
Merger 
It is self-evident that an issuer cannot be liable for 
failing to disclose a risk factor that did not exist at the time of 
disclosure.  See In re NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1330 (“To be 
actionable, a[n] . . . omission must have been misleading at the 
time it was made . . . .”); see also Silverstrand Invs. v. AMAG 
Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (requiring that 
plaintiff “allege sufficient facts to infer that a registrant knew, 
as of [the] time of the offering, that . . . a risk factor existed”).  
Thus, if the second amended complaint failed to plausibly 
allege that the consumer violations posed a risk to the merger 
at the time the Joint Proxy issued, then this claim related to the 
consumer violations was properly dismissed.   
 
Very few of the allegations in the second amended 
complaint relate to the consumer violations.  The complaint 
does, however, allege that the practice underlying the 
violations was curtailed prior to the date the Joint Proxy was 
filed with the SEC.  It also alleges that the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) eventually took action against 
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M&T for the consumer violations.  From these allegations, the 
shareholders ask us to infer that the consumer violations posed 
a risk to regulatory approval of the merger, despite cessation of 
the practice by the time the Joint Proxy issued.  The District 
Court declined to draw such an inference.  We, however, 
conclude that this inference was reasonable and, as such, the 
pleading standard required the District Court to draw it.  
Despite the fact that M&T had ceased the practice, it is 
plausible that the allegedly high volume of past violations 
made the upcoming merger vulnerable to regulatory delay.  
Accordingly, the District Court erred when it concluded that 
the second amended complaint failed to plausibly allege that 
the consumer violations posed a significant risk to the merger 
at the time the Joint Proxy issued.6   
b. Scope of Disclosure under Item 503(c) 
Nonetheless, M&T may avoid liability if the risks posed 
by the consumer violations and BSA/AML deficiencies were 
fully disclosed in the proxy materials.  Unsurprisingly, the 
parties dispute whether these risks were adequately disclosed.   
 
We begin with the text of the regulation itself.  Item 
503(c) requires issuers, “[w]here appropriate, [to] provide 
under the caption ‘Risk Factors’ a discussion of the most 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky.”  
                                              
6 Regarding whether the BSA/AML deficiencies presented a 
risk to the merger at the time the proxy materials issued, the 
District Court assumed this was so, and M&T does not argue 
otherwise.  In any event, independent review of the 
allegations confirms that the shareholders properly pleaded 
that the deficiencies did pose a risk to approval of the merger. 
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17 C.F.R. 229.503(c).  With respect to the scope of a sufficient 
disclosure, Item 503(c) instructs:  
 
[t]his discussion must be concise 
and organized logically. Do not 
present risks that could apply to 
any issuer or any offering. Explain 
how the risk affects the issuer or 
the securities being offered. Set 
forth each risk factor under a 
subcaption that adequately 
describes the risk.   
 
Id.  Additionally, Item 503(c) includes a non-exhaustive list of 
potential risk factors to be disclosed.  Id.  We note that the plain 
text of the regulation directs issuers to avoid generic 
disclosures. 7 
 
Although we have yet to analyze the scope of adequate 
disclosure under Item 503(c), two of our sister Circuits—the 
First and the Second—have considered the sufficiency of Item 
                                              
7 As an aside, the shareholders acknowledge that 
certain statements relevant to our analysis were made outside 
of the “Risk Factors” section of the Joint Proxy.  They, 
however, do not argue that this amounts to a per se violation 
of Item 503(c).  Rather, they assume we may consider these 
statements and contend that the statements do not provide 
details sufficient to demonstrate adequate disclosure as a 
matter of law. 
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503(c) disclosures as a matter of law.8  In Silverstrand 
Investments v. AMAG Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 707 F.3d 95 (1st 
Cir. 2013), the First Circuit denied a motion to dismiss, 
concluding that plaintiffs plausibly alleged that disclosures 
made in a pharmaceutical company’s offering documents were 
inadequate.  AMAG was a pharmaceutical company marketing 
Feraheme, “an alternative to current treatments for iron 
deficiency anemia.”  Id. at 99.  In its offering documents, 
AMAG included detailed disclosures about the FDA approval 
process and the results of Feraheme’s clinical trials prior to 
receiving FDA approval.  Id.  However, AMAG did not 
disclose that it had reported to the FDA at least twenty-three 
occurrences of severe adverse events (“SAEs”) since the 
drug’s inception to market.  Id. at 98–100.  When a security 
analyst publicly reported the SAEs, AMAG’s stock 
plummeted.  Id. at 99–100. 
 
The Silverstrand plaintiffs argued that Item 503(c) 
required disclosure of the SAEs.  The First Circuit agreed, 
opining that “[c]ommon sense . . . dictate[d] that AMAG knew 
that the riskier Feraheme appeared, the less attractive the drug 
would be as a method of treatment, and the less likely an 
investor would be to invest in AMAG, whose profits entirely 
depended on Feraheme’s commercial success.”  Id. at 104.  
Ultimately, the First Circuit concluded that plaintiffs’ 
complaint, which alleged that AMAG failed to disclose the 
                                              
8 Both Circuits reviewed securities fraud claims brought 
pursuant to §§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77k and 77l.  Any distinctions between these statutory 
provisions and § 14(a) (i.e., the securities filings they address 
or the participants they make liable) are, however, immaterial 
for our purposes. 
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SAEs despite knowing about them, plausibly stated a claim for 
omission of an Item 503(c) risk factor.  Id. at 103–06. 
 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in City of Pontiac 
Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement System v. UBS AG, 752 
F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2014), provides a useful contrast.  In that 
case, the court granted a motion to dismiss, concluding that 
disclosures regarding tax compliance made in a company’s 
offering materials were adequate as a matter of law.  UBS, 752 
F.3d at 182–88.  The plaintiffs alleged that, between 2001 and 
2007, UBS engaged in a cross-border scheme wherein Swiss 
bankers evaded taxes by travelling in and out of the United 
States to advise clients.  Id. at 178.  In May 2008, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the SEC investigated UBS 
for this conduct and, in 2009, UBS entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with the DOJ and the IRS.  Id.  
The DPA stated that UBS had violated United States tax laws 
and that it had paid a fine of hundreds of millions of dollars.  
Id.  In its offering material, UBS disclosed that it was under 
investigation by the DOJ for its cross-border scheme.  Id. at 
182, 184.  However, UBS did not disclose that its cross-border 
activities were ongoing, nor did it disclose the magnitude of 
UBS’s exposure.  Id. 
 
Plaintiffs argued that UBS violated Item 503(c) 
because, “in addition to disclosing the existence of an 
investigation, defendants were required to disclose that UBS 
was, in fact, engaged in an ongoing tax evasion scheme.”  Id. 
at 184.  The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding that 
plaintiffs failed to plead a cause of action because UBS had 
satisfied its disclosure obligations under Item 503(c):  
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As we have explained, 
“[d]isclosure is not a rite of 
confession,” and companies do not 
have a duty “to disclose 
uncharged, unadjudicated 
wrongdoing.” By disclosing its 
involvement in multiple legal 
proceedings and government 
investigations and indicating that 
its involvement could expose UBS 
“to substantial monetary damages 
and legal defense costs,” as well as 
“injunctive relief, criminal and 
civil penalties[,] and the potential 
for regulatory restrictions,” UBS 
complied with its disclosure 
obligations under our case law. 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 
 Read together, these cases suggest that generic 
disclosures which could apply across an industry are 
insufficient.  Rather, adequate disclosures are company-
specific.  They include facts particular to a company, such as 
its financial status, its products, any ongoing investigations, 
and its relationships with other entities.  See, e.g., Plymouth 
Cty. Ret. Ass’n v. Primo Water Corp., 966 F. Supp. 2d 525, 
560–61 (M.D.N.C. 2013) (granting motion to dismiss where 
risk disclosures “were specific and tailored and fairly 
addressed the risks that the amended complaint alleges”); City 
of Roseville Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. 2d 395, 405, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying motion to 
dismiss where offering materials emphasized company’s 
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“unique stewardship initiative” and identified thirteen potential 
clients, but allegations suggested regulatory agency had 
rejected similar initiatives and clients had already declined 
company’s services); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 628, 691–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying summary 
judgment for defendants where registration statement 
repeatedly discussed “the intense competition that WorldCom 
was facing,” but not “the alleged precarious state of 
WorldCom’s profit margins . . . and the impact of that problem 
on its business as a whole, including its ability to service its 
debt.”). 
 
 We next turn to SEC guidance concerning the scope of 
Item 503(c) disclosures.  Cf. Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 
F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding further support in agency 
guidance when interpreting an unambiguous statutory 
provision).  This guidance indicates that inadequate 
disclosure—particularly in the form of disclosing only generic 
risk factors—presents a persistent problem.  The Updated Staff 
Legal Bulletin released by the SEC in 1999 is illustrative.  See 
SEC Division of Corporation Finance: Updated Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 7, “Plain English Disclosure,” Release No. SLB-
7, 1999 WL 34984247 (June 7, 1999).  A section of the Bulletin 
titled “Risk Factor Guidance” leads with the directive that 
“issuers should not present risks that could apply to any issuer 
or any offering.”  Id. at *1.  Observing that “Item 503(c) seems 
to be the least understood of the plain English requirements,” 
the Bulletin includes two examples of what the SEC would 
consider to be sufficient disclosures.  Id. at *1, *6–7.  These 
examples are highly descriptive and include facts regarding, 
inter alia, each company’s finances—including debt and 
leverage positions—products, market, and competition.  Id. at 
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*6–7.  They also describe how certain risks may impact the 
value of the company.  Id. 
 
 The Bulletin also provides a heuristic for drafting risk 
factors.  The SEC explains that Item 503(c) risk factors loosely 
fall into three broad categories: 
 
Industry Risk — risks companies 
face by virtue of the industry 
they’re in. For example, many 
[real estate investment trusts] run 
the risk that, despite due diligence, 
they will acquire properties with 
significant environmental issues. 
 
Company Risk — risks that are 
specific to the company. For 
example, a [real estate investment 
trust] owns four properties with 
significant environmental issues 
and cleaning up these properties 
will be a serious financial drain. 
 
Investment Risk — risks that are 
specifically tied to a security. For 
example, in a debt offering, the 
debt being offered is the most 
junior subordinated debt of the 
company. When drafting risk 
factors, be sure to specifically link 
each risk to your industry, 
company, or investment, as 
applicable.  
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Id. at *5–6. 
 
Additionally, the Bulletin contains comments 
frequently issued by SEC investigators when they are 
confronted with inadequate risk factor disclosures.  For 
example: 
 
#35 Item 503(c) of Regulation 
S-K states that issuers should not 
“present risk factors that could 
apply to any issuer or to any 
offering.” For example, the risk 
you disclose under “Dependence 
on Key Personnel” could apply to 
nearly any issuer in your industry 
and even in other industries. If you 
elect to retain these and other 
general risk factors in your 
prospectus, you must clearly 
explain how they apply to your 
industry, company, or offering. 
For example, explain why you are 
concerned you could lose these 
key personnel. Are they about to 
retire? Do you not have 
employment contracts with them? 
 
Id. at *14. 
 
 The 1999 Bulletin’s focus on making risk disclosures 
more specific is not unique.  As recently as 2016, the SEC 
sought comments on how to revise its regulations in a way that 
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would “encourage registrants to describe risks with greater 
specificity and context[,]” and “discourage registrants from 
providing risk factor disclosure that is not specific to the 
registrant but instead describes risks that are common to an 
industry or registrants in general.”  See Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33-10064, 81 Fed. Reg. 23916, 23956 (Apr. 22, 
2016).  We note that the SEC guidance is consistent with the 
First and Second Circuit’s conclusion that a disclosure of risk 
factors is insufficient if it could apply to any company in a 
given industry. 
 
 Additionally, the shareholders suggest that Item 503(c) 
incorporates two general obligations beyond what we have 
described above: (1) a duty to disclose all material facts; and 
(2) a duty to disclose corporate wrongdoing.  Not so. 
 
First, our securities laws do not impose a duty to 
disclose all material facts.  Rather, mandatory disclosures are 
limited by our holding in Seinfeld, in which we explained that 
“omission of information from a proxy statement” is not 
actionable unless either “SEC regulations specifically require 
disclosure of the omitted information” or “the omission makes 
other statements in the proxy statement materially false or 
misleading.”  461 F.3d at 369 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 
114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that securities 
laws do not impose a “general duty . . . to provide the public 
with all material information”).   
 
 Second, we have never recognized a duty to disclose all 
corporate wrongdoing in securities filings.  See Gen. Elec. 
Co. by Levit v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927, 935 (3d Cir. 1992) 
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(“[S]peculative disclosure is not required under Section 14(a).  
Wide authority establishes that while pending litigation may be 
material under certain circumstances, the mere possibility of 
litigation is not.”); accord UBS, 752 F.3d at 184 (“Disclosure 
is not a rite of confession, and companies do not have a duty to 
disclose uncharged, unadjudicated wrongdoing.”) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted).  Rather, a duty to 
disclose corporate misconduct is only triggered where non-
disclosure makes other voluntary statements misleading.  See 
Meyer v. Jinkosolar Holdings Co., 761 F.3d 245, 251–52 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of summary judgment because 
trier of fact could find omissions regarding ongoing 
compliance violations may have “render[ed] misleading the 
comforting statements . . . about compliance measures”).   
c. The Proxy Materials Did Not Sufficiently Disclose the 
Alleged Risk Factors as a Matter of Law 
Having explored the scope of adequate disclosure under 
Item 503(c), we consider whether the District Court erred in 
applying this regulation to the allegations in the second 
amended complaint.  The District Court did not discuss 
whether the risks posed by the consumer violations were 
sufficiently disclosed.  Similarly, the District Court did not 
decide whether the supplemental disclosures cured any alleged 
omissions in the Joint Proxy.  The District Court did, however, 
conclude that the statements made in the Joint Proxy 
sufficiently disclosed the risks related to the BSA/AML 
deficiencies as a matter of law. 
 
Regarding the consumer violations, the Joint Proxy did 
not make any reference to the fraudulent practice underlying 
the violations, the dates the practice was in place, the extent of 
consumer accounts affected by the practice, or the subsequent 
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CFPB investigation into the practice.  Rather, in the section 
labelled “Regulatory Approvals Required for the Merger,” the 
Joint Proxy reminded shareholders that “[c]ompletion of the 
merger and bank merger are subject to the receipt of all 
approvals required to complete the transactions contemplated 
by the merger agreement . . . .”  (App. A304.)  The Joint Proxy 
further warned: 
 
Although we currently believe we 
should be able to obtain all 
required regulatory approvals in a 
timely manner, we cannot be 
certain when or if we will obtain 
them or, if obtained, whether they 
will contain terms, conditions or 
restrictions not currently 
contemplated that will be 
detrimental to M&T after the 
completion of the merger or will 
contain a burdensome condition.  
 
(Id.)  
 
The shareholders’ allegations plausibly suggested that 
the Joint Proxy’s disclosures concerning the consumer 
violations were too generic to be adequate.  Most strikingly, 
the Joint Proxy’s statements are not company-specific.  For 
instance, the “Regulatory Approvals Required for the Merger” 
section could easily apply to any consumer bank in the industry 
considering a merger.  See In re WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 
691–92 (denying summary judgment where offering 
documents referenced competition generally, rather than 
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details of company’s indebtedness, lack of cash flow, and 
underperforming stock). 
 
While it is possible that the supplemental disclosures 
cured any inadequate disclosures in the Joint Proxy, the 
supplemental disclosures related exclusively to the BSA/AML 
deficiencies and did not address the consumer violations.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the shareholders alleged a 
plausible claim for relief under Item 503(c) regarding M&T’s 
inadequate disclosure of the consumer violations. 
 
 Regarding the BSA/AML deficiencies, the Joint Proxy 
did not discuss them expressly.  It did not describe M&T’s 
“Know Your Customer” program, its claimed deficiencies, the 
number of customer accounts affected by the program’s 
deficiencies, the Federal Reserve Board investigation, or the 
costs of remediation.  The Joint Proxy did, however, mention 
anti-money laundering compliance.  For example, the Joint 
Proxy explained that completion of the merger was subject to 
approval by the Federal Reserve Board.  According to the Joint 
Proxy, “[a]s part of its evaluation of these factors, the Federal 
Reserve Board reviews: . . .  the effectiveness of the companies 
in combatting money laundering.”  (App. A0305.)  As with the 
consumer violations, it is plausible that these boilerplate 
disclosures were too generic to communicate anything 
meaningful about this specific risk to the merger. 
 
Unlike the consumer violations, however, the 
BSA/AML deficiencies are addressed in the supplemental 
disclosures.  Specifically, M&T stated in the supplemental 
disclosures that it was the subject of a Federal Reserve Board 
investigation regarding its BSA/AML compliance.  M&T 
warned that the investigation would likely result in delay of 
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regulatory approval of the merger and, by extension, closing of 
the merger.  The substance of these disclosures was likely 
adequate as a matter of law.  As in UBS, M&T disclosed the 
pertinent fact—i.e., that it was the subject of an investigation 
that could impact the closing of the merger.  See 752 F.3d at 
184 (holding disclosure of ongoing FBI investigation into UBS 
was sufficient despite absence of details of scheme under 
investigation).  Because “[d]isclosure is not a rite of 
confession,” id., M&T was likely not required to dive into the 
weeds and provide details of the shortcomings of its “Know 
Your Customer” program.   
 
 Even if the supplemental disclosures were sufficient 
with respect to the BSA/AML deficiencies, however, the 
shareholders dispute that the supplemental disclosures were 
disseminated in a way that guaranteed adequate disclosure.  
The SEC has long recognized that it is “of overriding 
importance . . . that shareholders be given timely and accurate 
information of material changes” occurring since the proxy 
was filed.  Staff Report on Proxy Solicitations, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-16343, 8 SEC Docket 927 (Nov. 27, 1979).  
However, “[t]he manner in which those responsible for 
solicitation of proxies elect to correct information which has 
proven incorrect due to subsequent circumstances, must, of 
necessity, be dictated by the individual set of circumstances 
that exist.”  Id.  According to the shareholders, the six days 
between the first supplemental disclosure, issued on April 12, 
2013, and the April 18 shareholder vote was not enough time 
for a reasonable investor to digest the information.  M&T 
counters by arguing there is no hard and fast deadline for filing 
supplemental disclosures.  
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While we agree that there is no deadline for filing a 
supplemental disclosure, we are not prepared to say the six 
days provided here was adequate as a matter of law.  Rather, 
we think the effect of the supplemental disclosures raises a fact 
issue, which precludes dismissal of the BSA/AML allegations 
at this time.   
 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
dismissal of the mandatory-disclosure claims relating to both 
the consumer violations and the BSA/AML deficiencies. 
2. Theory Two: Misleading Opinions 
 In their second theory of liability, the shareholders 
argue that two statements of opinion contained in the Joint 
Proxy—that M&T believed the merger would close timely and 
that M&T believed its BSA/AML program was compliant with 
the Patriot Act—are actionable under Omnicare.   
 
 In Omnicare, the Supreme Court held that an opinion is 
only misleading under an omissions theory if the speaker 
“omits material facts” about its “inquiry into or knowledge 
concerning a statement of opinion” that “conflict with what a 
reasonable investor would take from the statement itself.”  135 
S. Ct. at 1329.  Satisfying this standard, the Court warned, is 
“no small task.”  Id. at 1332.  To illustrate, the Court considered 
the hypothetical statement: “We believe our conduct is lawful.”  
Id. at 1328.  According to the Court, a reasonable investor may 
assume an issuer consulted a lawyer before forming such an 
opinion.  Id.  A reasonable investor may also assume that the 
lawyer concurred with the substantive assessment.  Id. at 1328–
29.  In other words, reasonable investors may expect 
compliance opinions to be both supported by “meaningful 
legal inquir[ies]” and to “fairly align[] with the information in 
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the [speaker’s] possession at the time.”  Id.  If the issuer did 
not consult a lawyer, or if the lawyer did not agree with the 
assessment, the issuer’s opinion regarding its compliance 
“could be misleadingly incomplete.”  Id. at 1328.   
 
 The Court also recognized that not every omission 
related to a speaker’s knowledge or process in forming an 
opinion is misleading.  “An opinion statement . . . is not 
necessarily misleading when an issuer knows, but fails to 
disclose, some fact cutting the other way.”  Id. at 1329.  This is 
because “[r]easonable investors understand that opinions 
sometimes rest on a weighing of competing facts; . . . [a] 
reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known to 
an issuer supports its opinion statement.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
plaintiffs must “identify particular (and material) facts going to 
the basis for the [speaker’s] opinion—facts about the inquiry 
[the speaker] did or did not conduct or the knowledge it did or 
did not have—whose omission makes the opinion statement at 
issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the statement 
fairly and in context.”  Id. at 1332.  A conclusory allegation 
that the speaker “lacked ‘reasonable grounds for the belief’ it 
stated” will not suffice.  Id. at 1333. 
 
 We have yet to decide whether Omnicare applies to 
claims brought under the Exchange Act, and in particular under 
§ 14(a).  Cf. In re Amarin Corp. PLC Sec. Litig., 689 F. App’x 
124, 132 n.12 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e decline to decide whether 
Omnicare is applicable to § 10(b) claims . . . .”).  We decline 
to do so again today because, even assuming Omnicare’s 
applicability, the shareholders failed to plausibly allege an 
actionably misleading opinion.  
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Here, the shareholders contend that two opinion 
statements made in or incorporated by reference into the Joint 
Proxy violated Omnicare.  The statements read as follows: 
 
[1] Although we currently believe 
we should be able to obtain all 
required regulatory approvals in a 
timely manner, we cannot be 
certain when or if we will obtain 
them or, if obtained, whether they 
will contain terms, conditions or 
restrictions not currently 
contemplated that will be 
detrimental to or have a material 
adverse effect on M&T or its 
subsidiaries after the completion 
of the merger. 
.     .     . 
 
[2] The Registrant and its impacted 
subsidiaries have approved 
policies and procedures that are 
believed to be compliant with the 
USA Patriot Act. 
 
(App. A0220, A1028) (emphasis added).  The shareholders 
argue that these opinion statements are misleading because: (1) 
they proved to be false; and (2) the Joint Proxy omitted facts 
concerning M&T’s process for forming these opinions.  
 
 The shareholders’ first argument is meritless.  They 
contend that the opinion statements are actionable because they 
were ultimately proved to be false—in other words, regulatory 
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approval was not obtained in a timely manner; and M&T was 
not compliant with the Patriot Act.  A similar argument was 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Omnicare:  “[A] sincere 
statement of pure opinion is not an ‘untrue statement of 
material fact,’ regardless [of]whether an investor can 
ultimately prove the belief wrong.”  135 S. Ct. at 1327.   
 
 The shareholders’ second argument, though stronger, is 
ultimately unpersuasive.  Apart from asserting, in conclusory 
fashion, that the banks acted negligently, the second amended 
complaint specifically alleges that M&T conducted “intensive 
due diligence” of Hudson’s operations from June 2012 to 
August 27, 2012.  (App. A0935.)  The complaint also alleges 
that Hudson’s due diligence investigation into M&T began on 
August 20, 2012 and lasted at most five business days.  It does 
not allege particular facts about the banks’ conduct during 
those investigations.  However, it does allege that sampling 
would have revealed the BSA/AML deficiencies—the 
implication being that the banks did not sample M&T’s 
customer accounts.  From these allegations, the shareholders 
ask us to infer that the banks did not conduct a meaningful 
inquiry before forming their opinions. 
 
 The first shortcoming in this argument is that the facts 
concerning the duration of the diligence period were disclosed 
in the Joint Proxy.  “[T]o avoid exposure for omissions,” a 
speaker “need only divulge an opinion’s basis, or else make 
clear the real tentativeness of its belief.”  Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1332.  Even if a reasonable investor would have expected 
the banks to conduct a lengthier due diligence period, the Joint 
Proxy provided her with enough information to understand that 
the banks did not do so here.   
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 What remains, then, are general allegations of 
inadequate diligence and one specific allegation that the banks 
did not conduct a sampling of M&T’s customer accounts.  
Because general allegations of negligence are insufficient to 
plead an Omnicare violation, see id. at 1333, we are left with 
the question of whether a reasonable investor would have 
expected the banks to conduct a sampling of customer 
accounts.  We think this solitary allegation concerning 
sampling is too weak to defeat the motion to dismiss.   
 
 First, sampling is a generic term that merely describes 
the act of selecting a subset of a much larger set one wishes to 
study.  The second amended complaint does not explain the 
method of sampling—i.e., how individual accounts should 
have been selected—nor does it describe the type of review to 
be conducted once an account was selected by this method.  
Second, sampling is presumably just one of several ways to 
conduct due diligence; nothing in the complaint suggests that 
sampling was the only way to conduct diligence here.  Without 
more, we do not think it plausible that a reasonable investor 
would have expected the banks to conduct a sampling of 
customer accounts; nor do we think it is plausible that a 
reasonable investor would have been misled by the banks’ 
failure to disclose that a sampling was not conducted. 
 
 The context of the opinions at issue further underscores 
our conclusion that a reasonable investor would not have been 
misled.  The opinions were made in the context of the Joint 
Proxy’s description of the increased scrutiny into BSA/AML 
compliance across the industry.  The opinions are also 
surrounded by cautionary language, warning of the uncertainty 
of future projections regarding regulatory approval.  This 
hedging is similar to that which was persuasive to the Supreme 
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Court in Omnicare, and suggests to us that a reasonable 
investor would not have been misled by the opinions.   
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of the misleading-opinion claims. 
B.  Whether the Second Amended Complaint 
Plausibly Alleged Loss Causation 
We conclude by addressing M&T’s alternative ground 
for affirmance: the shareholders’ alleged failure to plead loss 
causation.  See Hassen v. Gov’t of V.I., 861 F.3d 108, 114 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (acknowledging that we may affirm on any ground 
supported by the record).  “The loss causation inquiry asks 
whether the misrepresentation or omission proximately caused 
the economic loss.”  McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 
418, 426 (3d Cir. 2007) (analyzing § 10(b) claim).  To 
plausibly allege loss causation, a “plaintiff must show that the 
defendant misrepresented or omitted the very facts that were a 
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s economic loss.”  Id.  
“[R]ecovery is not limited to out of pocket loss, a diminution 
in the value of one’s investment, but may include loss of a 
possible profit or benefit, an addition to the value of one’s 
investment, unless the loss is wholly speculative.”  Gould, 535 
F.2d at 781, 782 (recognizing “that by the circulation . . . of the 
defective proxy materials the plaintiffs were lulled to inaction 
and thereby suffered the loss of an opportunity to attempt to 
secure a merger agreement which would be more favorable to 
them”). 
 
The District Court did not address whether the second 
amended complaint plausibly alleged loss causation.  The 
District Court did, however, find that the first amended 
complaint plausibly alleged loss causation, and the allegations 
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regarding loss are identical in both pleadings. The shareholders 
maintain three theories of loss on appeal: (1) the lost 
opportunity of a more favorable merger premium; (2) the lost 
opportunity of a higher dividend; and (3) the lost opportunity 
of investing in a company without—to use the language of the 
complaint—M&T’s “spotty regulatory record.”  (App. 
A0926.)  M&T counters that there was no loss as a matter of 
law because: (1) the shareholders profited from the merger to 
the tune of $1.9 billion; (2) the shareholders’ more-favorable-
merger-premium theory is “entirely speculative” in that there 
was no competing offer and no reason to believe the 
shareholders would have rejected the merger but for a more 
favorable premium; (3) the shareholders’ higher dividend 
theory is “too attenuated” in that Hudson’s Board had complete 
discretion to issue a dividend; (4) the alleged dividends were 
dispensed between the shareholder vote and the merger’s 
closing and so cannot be attributed to the merger; and (5) 
despite an allegedly “spotty regulatory record,”  M&T’s stock 
price rose after the merger closed.  (Appellees’ Br. at 45–48.) 
 
While it is true that the shareholders earned a profit after 
the merger closed, this does not necessarily negate any alleged 
lost opportunities.  See Gould, 535 F.2d at 781.  On the other 
hand, we agree that the shareholders’ loss allegations border 
on speculative.  Although loss causation may ultimately be 
difficult for the shareholders to establish, we will not say that 
the shareholders’ allegations are facially implausible.  Where, 
as here, resolution is likely to turn on the specifics of the 
merger negotiations and the inferences that should be drawn 
therefrom, we think dismissal would be premature.  
Accordingly, we find that the shareholders’ allegations of loss 
causation are sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part and 
affirm in part the District Court’s Order dated November 21, 
2017.  On remand, the District Court is directed to proceed to 
discovery on the mandatory-disclosure claims. 
